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Exchange rate policy in the Philippines can be viewed in a
number of ways, depending on what aspect of the public interest is
being considered. In the narrowest sense, it relates to the Philippine
peso-United States (US) dollar exchange rate, information on which
is available daily from newspapers and other media sources. Interest
in the peso exchange rate with the US dollar presumably reflects
the fact that the US dollar is the world’s most important currency
(for various reasons), and also that the US has the largest share of
Philippine international transactions. About a third of the country’s
foreign trade, for example, was contributed by the US in the last
decade.
There is also public interest in the peso exchange rate with the
Japanese yen, Japan being the second most important contributor
to Philippine foreign trade and payments. In the last decade Japan
accounted for about one-fourth of the country’s merchandise trade.
The total share of other trade partners was slightly above 40 percent,
each of which contributed less than 10 percent. More broadly, under
the present system of generalized currency floating, the nominal
effective exchange rate (NEER)—representing a weighted average
of peso exchange rates with trade-partner currencies—is also of
policy interest. NEER changes have financial effects and implications
for macroeconomic stability.
At another level exchange rate policy can be viewed in terms
of the behavior of the real exchange rate (RER). The latter represents
the domestic price of tradable goods relative to nontradables1 andExchange Rate Policy in Philippine Development
provides the mechanism through which the further repercussions
on output growth, income distribution and other development
concerns can be traced. The real exchange rate—more appropriately,
the real effective exchange rate (REER)—is a key macroeconomic
relative price influencing the composition of production and
absorption between tradable and nontradable goods. Relative
production incentives, including the incentive structure for export
producers, are affected directly by the REER. The real exchange rate
thus plays an important role in the outward-oriented development
strategy that the Philippines has ostensibly followed since the early
1970s.
The Philippine peso was already under “managed floating,”
at least with respect to its exchange rate with the US dollar, when
currency floating among developed countries was adopted in 1973.
The latter effectively ended the maintenance of exchange rate parities
among International Monetary Fund (IMF) member-countries under
the Bretton Woods system. Earlier, in late 1969, the need to service
short-term credit that had financed the country’s large trade deficits
of the immediately preceding years precipitated a foreign exchange
crisis. In February 1970 the government allowed the peso-US dollar
exchange rate to float. By December the exchange rate had settled
to P6.40 per dollar, representing an effective devaluation of 61
percent during the year. Previously, in 1962, the Philippine peso
was similarly devalued—from P2.00 per dollar (the official exchange
rate even before World War II) to P3.90 per dollar.
Exogenous changes in the exchange rates of major currencies
would seem an added source of external economic disturbance to
developing countries with strong links in trade and payments to
developed countries. In the Philippine case, particular interest
attaches understandably to the exchange rate between the US dollar
and Japanese yen, which in the last decade was subject to sharp
changes; from an average of ¥134.70 per dollar in 1991, it fell
continuously to ¥94.10 in 1995, moved up to ¥130.90 in 1998, then
declined steeply to ¥103.90 in the following year before rising again
to ¥127.40 in 2001.
On the positive side, the system of generalized currency floating
presented an opportunity to undertake more active exchange rate
2management in pursuing external balance and other policy
objectives. By wide agreement, developing countries’ currencies had
been generally overvalued, trade controls and tariff walls being
used to defend unrealistic exchange rates, which contributed to
the distortion of investment incentives and inefficiency in resource
allocation. Most devaluations in the 1950s and 1960s had taken place
in crisis atmosphere and entailed large, abrupt exchange rate changes
which frequently resulted in severe dislocations for the developing
economy. Exchange rate flexibility under the new system rendered
large, once-and-for-all devaluations unnecessary, since gradual (and
hence, less disruptive) exchange rate adjustment could be
undertaken that would facilitate the correction of currency
overvaluation.
Generalized currency floating came at a time of growing policy
emphasis among developing countries in export promotion and
diversification, moving away from the heavy import substitution
drive of the 1950s and 1960s. In the Philippine case, the enactment
of the Export Incentives Act of 1970 signaled a policy shift towards
a more outward-looking industrial development strategy. Among
other incentives, manufacturing firms registered under the Export
Incentives Act qualified for various kinds of tax exemptions,
deductions from taxable income, and tax credits. This served to
compensate in part for the still substantial bias in the incentive
system against export production (Bautista, Power and Associates
1979). The highly protective tariff system constituted the primary
source of this bias, but no attempt was made to deal with it directly
as part of the industrial export promotion program during the 1970s.
Furthermore, there was a marked rise in the number of imported
products subject to quantitative restrictions (QRs), its share in the
total number of Philippine Standard Industrial Classification (PSIC)
seven-digit product categories doubling from 26 percent in 1970 to
52 percent in 1980. Although the real exchange rate depreciated in
the early 1970s (Baldwin 1975) even with increased import controls,
it continued to be overvalued—indicating an incentive bias against
exports and other tradable goods. The average RER overvaluation
has been estimated at 24 percent for the period 1970-74 and even
higher at 32 percent for 1975-79 (Intal and Power 1990). Based on
3
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the comparison given in Bautista (1990), these rates are much higher
than those derived for Thailand (16 and 24 percent, respectively)
and Malaysia (less than three percent for both periods) using the
same estimation methodology.
The relative uncompetitiveness of domestic industry in the
Philippines has been attributed to market price distortions arising
from biased trade and exchange rate policies that reduced the
efficiency of resource allocation and investment (Baldwin 1975).
Also, the sustained overvaluation of the real exchange rate prevented
a more rapid export growth and slowed the expansion of the national
economy in the 1970s (Bautista, Power and Associates 1979). Not
only would economic growth have been more sustainable had the
real exchange rate been more favorable to tradable goods production,
labor employment and use of locally produced inputs would have
been greater. The choice of products and the choice of production
technology would have favored increased utilization of the country’s
abundant unskilled labor force and, because the poor accounted
heavily for the unemployed and underemployed, greater
participation of the poor in the growth process. Indeed, the results
of cross-country regressions indicate that RER depreciations tend
to lower poverty in developing economies (Agenor 2002).
In this paper we examine the conduct of exchange rate policy
in the Philippines since the early 1980s, paying particular attention
to the influence of exchange rate adjustments on relative production
incentives. The latter serves to provide a link to the further
repercussions on resource allocation, output growth, and income
distribution—which are important considerations for the country’s
economic development. Rather than the nominal exchange rate (of
which the government has some control), it is the real exchange
rate, which adjusts for domestic and foreign inflation, that is relevant
in the assessment of relative incentives. The present study focuses
on the incentive structure between tradable and nontradable goods
production, and among different industries within the tradable
goods sector. While our primary interest is in the exchange rate
regime and its incentive effects, the role of trade policy has to be
simultaneously analyzed in view of its influence on the conduct of
exchange rate policy as well as its direct effect on the real exchange
4rate. Moreover, there are analytical and empirical linkages of the
real exchange rate to macroeconomic policy that need to be
examined.
Section 2 develops the framework of analysis. We first describe
the measurement and “accounting” determinants of the nominal
and real exchange rates under the present system of generalized
currency floating. This is followed by an analytical discussion of
relative incentives between tradables and nontradables, and also
among different tradable goods industries, paying attention to the
separate effects of exchange rate and trade policies. The “behavioral”
determinants of the real exchange rate are then discussed,
identifying two policy-induced sources of incentive bias against
tradable goods production and the scope for policy improvement
with reference to the overvaluation of the real exchange rate. The
section ends with an examination of the possible conflict between
trade policy and exchange rate adjustment in the Philippine
context, underscoring the need for coordination to help achieve
policy goals.
The following two sections of the paper describe the policy
developments and present the empirical analysis of the study for
the decade of the 1980s (Section 3) and the more recent period since
the early 1990s (Section 4). Each of these two periods was marked
by a “crisis”—the external debt-related foreign exchange crisis of
1983-85 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98—which, despite
their differing sources of origin, had wide-ranging effects on the
national economy, including the conduct of trade and exchange rate
policies. The empirical analysis starts with an examination of the
annual values of the peso-dollar exchange rate, NEER and REER
indices, and a decomposition of observed REER changes into their
accounting components during specific subperiods. We then
investigate the factors affecting the past behavior of the real exchange
rate, distinguishing those that are determined by domestic policies
and those associated with external developments outside the control
of policymakers. This is followed by an examination of the influences
of trade and exchange rate policies on production incentives for
different industries within the tradable goods sector.
The concluding section summarizes the main findings of the





Nominal and real exchange rates under generalized floating
In contrast to the pre-1973 Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange
rates among currencies of IMF-member countries, the value of any
country’s currency under the present regime of generalized currency
floating can change exogenously with exchange rate realignments
among trade-partner currencies. The nominal exchange rate is thus
more appropriately measured by a nominal effective exchange rate
index that represents a weighted average of the nominal exchange
rates with trade-partner currencies:
(1) NEER  =  Π Ri
w
i
where Ri is the nominal exchange rate index (relative to a base year
level) in home-country currency per unit of trade partner i’s currency,
and wi is the trade share of country i (Σwi = 1).
Analytical discussions in which foreign prices are assumed
fixed typically represent the real exchange rate simply as a ratio of
the nominal exchange rate to a general price index in the “small
country” under study. In empirical work that traces the movement
of the real exchange rate over time, foreign prices cannot be assumed
constant. With generalized currency floating, changes in the general
price level in each trade partner, as well as in the bilateral exchange
rates, need to be taken into account.
A broad measure of the real exchange rate can be represented
by a real effective exchange rate index calculated, for a home country
in a given year, as follows:
(2) REER  =  Π (Ri ⋅ Pi)w
i / P
6where Pi and P denote the general price level in trade partner i
and in the home country, respectively. The wholesale price index,
which consists mostly of the prices of tradable goods, and the
consumer price index, which includes the prices of nontradables,
are typically used for Pi and P, respectively. The real exchange
rate can then be interpreted as the relative price of tradable goods
vis-à-vis nontradables, representing therefore a relative incentive
measure between tradable and nontradable goods. A real
depreciation of the home currency (i.e., an increase in REER)
improves the price competitiveness of tradable goods, encouraging
their production relative to nontradables.
Equation (2) can be transformed into the following relationship
involving first differences of natural logarithms:
(3) Δln REER  =  Δln NEER  -  Δln P  +  Σ wi Δln Pi
which shows a decomposition of any change in the real effective
exchange rate into three components involving changes in the
nominal effective exchange rate, domestic inflation, and foreign
inflation. While changes in the exchange rates of foreign currencies
are exogenous to a small country, it is possible in principle to achieve
any target NEER by pegging to a chosen standard—whether a single
currency or basket of currencies—and adjusting the peg
appropriately (Bautista 1982). The right-hand side of equation (3)
indicates that the REER behavior can be attributed not only to the
country’s exchange rate policy but also to a host of factors influencing
the general price level and to exogenous inflation rates in trade-
partner countries. The effect of a depreciating home currency on
the real exchange rate, for example, can be undercut by a rise in
domestic prices—which would be related to the monetary and fiscal
policy measures accompanying the nominal exchange rate
depreciation.
Relative incentives among tradable goods
We make use of two well-known measures, the effective protection
rate (EPR) and the net effective protection rate (NEPR), to represent
the incentive structure among tradable goods industries resulting
7
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from import protection without and with adjustment for exchange
rate overvaluation, respectively. The EPR and NEPR are rates of
protection of value added by domestic factors measured by the
proportionate difference between domestic and foreign value added,
the latter being evaluated at the actual exchange rate for the EPR
and at the “equilibrium” exchange rate (see below) for the NEPR.
For any industry j, the relationship between EPRj and NEPRj is given
by (Balassa 1971):
(4) NEPRj  =  (1+ EPRj)/(1+ ρ)  -  1
where ρ is the degree of exchange rate overvaluation, that is, the
proportionate difference between the actual and equilibrium
exchange rates. Thus, if ρ = EPRj, then the net effective protection to
industry j is zero. To compensate tradable goods producers for the
price penalty of an overvalued exchange rate, they need to be given
an effective protection equal to the degree of exchange rate
overvaluation.
As will be shown in the following discussion, import protection
itself contributes to exchange rate overvaluation, which need to be
taken into account in isolating the effect of trade policy on relative
incentives among tradable goods.
Two policy-induced sources of real exchange rate overvaluation
It is in an accounting sense that movements of the real exchange
rate can be attributed to movements of the nominal exchange rate,
foreign prices (exogenous in the small country case) and the general
level of domestic prices. Since domestic prices are affected by
nominal exchange rate changes (to an extent determined by the
accompanying fiscal and monetary policies), there is no one-to-one
correspondence between the nominal and real exchange rates.
Behaviorally, the real exchange rate adjusts to bring about
equilibrium in the markets for tradable and nontradable goods.
Changes in the real exchange rate are explained in the theoretical
literature in terms of at least three factors that affect the supply of
and demand for those goods. These are the country’s trade policy,
current account balance, and external terms of trade. The first two
8are policy variables that historically have caused the real exchange
rate in most developing countries to be overvalued.
Trade policy is represented by import quotas/tariffs and export
taxes/subsidies. The imposition of tariffs, for example, raises the
domestic price of importables relative to exportables and
nontradables, leading to increased demand for the latter goods. To
restore equilibrium in the nontradables market, the price of
nontradables must rise relative to the price of exportables and the
post-tariff price of importables. Thus, the real exchange rate
appreciates and becomes overvalued relative to what it would be
without the tariffs. While export subsidies have a similar effect on
the real exchange rate, it is the adoption of import-protection policies
that in the past sustained real exchange rate overvaluation in the
Philippines and most other developing economies.
A deficit in the current account, another widespread tendency
among developing countries, implies an excess demand for foreign
exchange, and its accommodation through reserve drawdowns or
capital inflows serves to defend an overvalued exchange rate. Over
a given period of time the real exchange rate will appreciate or
depreciate as the current account deficit increases or decreases. The
current account balance is traditionally considered a policy variable,
determined largely by macroeconomic policies, including foreign
borrowing policy, that determine the disparity between national
income and expenditure. This view has less relevance to economies
that are highly integrated to the world financial system, as shown
dramatically by the massive movement of private capital leading to
the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. However, there is a policy option
of imposing controls on capital flows that a few developing country
governments have actually adopted.
The external terms of trade, over which policymakers have no
control, affects the relative price of tradables to nontradables in two
ways. One is through the substitution effect. A deterioration of the
terms of trade arising from an increase in import prices increases
the domestic price of importables, raises the demand for
nontradables, and results in an appreciating real exchange rate. The
other is through the income effect. Higher import prices serve to
reduce the purchasing power of a given real income. The effect on
9
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relative demand for tradable and nontradable goods, as well as on
their relative prices, would depend on the income elasticities of
demand for these goods. If the substitution effect is stronger than
the income effect, the real exchange rate must appreciate to restore
equilibrium. Alternatively, if the terms-of-trade deterioration arises
from a fall in export prices, both the substitution and income effects
will reduce the demand for nontradables, leading to a depreciation
of the real exchange rate. While the net effect of terms of trade
changes on the real exchange rate cannot be established a priori,
empirical findings indicate that a worsening of the terms of trade is
likely to result in a depreciation of the real exchange rate (Edwards
1988).
In addition to these three long-run influences, the nominal
exchange rate is widely observed to affect the short-run behavior of
the real exchange rate. The latter being a relative price variable, its
long-run level is not likely to be affected by nominal variables.
However, in the short run, exchange rate management can facilitate
the adjustment of the real exchange rate to changes in the real
variables. As indicated earlier, the NEER is a policy decision. Even
at a time of external turbulence, setting the nominal exchange rate
is the policymakers’ prerogative, exemplified by the adoption of a
fixed exchange rate of the Malaysian ringgit to the US dollar in the
wake of the Asian financial crisis.
The real exchange rate appreciates or depreciates over time,
depending on the trade policy being adopted, behavior of the current
account, movement of the foreign terms of trade, and as a short-run
influence, nominal exchange rate adjustment. Other things
remaining the same, trade liberalization will depreciate the real
exchange rate; however, if the current account balance deteriorates
and/or the external terms of trade improves, it is possible for the
real exchange rate to appreciate instead. Conversely, a more
restrictive trade policy and real exchange rate depreciation can take
place at the same time.
In contrast to the appreciation or depreciation of the real
exchange rate which occurs over time, its overvaluation or
undervaluation is in reference to an equilibrium value of the real
exchange rate at a given time, the latter being associated here—as
10in most other empirical studies2—with a completely open trade
regime (with zero implicit tariff and export tax rates) and current
account balance. Thus, an overvalued real exchange rate will result
from the adoption of a restrictive trade policy and/or from incurring
a deficit in the current account. Real exchange rate overvaluation
discriminates against tradable goods production, and it can be
corrected only by removing the source of the incentive bias. Nominal
exchange rate adjustment is typically needed to bring about real
depreciation that can reduce a high degree of real exchange rate
overvaluation. However, without accompanying measures to
address the two sources of policy-induced bias—namely, trade
liberalization and macroeconomic policies to reduce the gap between
national income and expenditure—a nominal depreciation will not
lead to a less overvalued real exchange rate. It may only raise the
general price level without affecting relative prices in the economy.
Possible conflict between trade policy and real exchange rate
adjustment
What happens if imports are liberalized but the real exchange rate
appreciates? This combination is possible since there are factors other
than trade policy that influence the behavior of the real exchange
rate. The likely effects are as follows. Import demand will increase
due to lower cost, affecting negatively the trade balance. The output
and employment effects will also be negative, since the domestic
prices of tradables—and hence, the profitability of producing both
export and import-competing goods—will fall as a result of the
exchange rate appreciation. A simultaneous trade liberalization and
real exchange rate appreciation is therefore not a desirable policy
combination.
Similarly, a depreciating real exchange rate is better
accompanied by import liberalization. As indicated earlier, the
Philippines began promoting an outward-looking development
strategy in the early 1970s with the enactment of the Export




2A prominent example is the World Bank comparative studies on agricultural pricing policy in
developing countries (Krueger, Schiff and Valdes 1988).effective exchange rate depreciation in 1970 and 1971 has been
estimated to range from 19 percent for “essential” producer goods
to 66 percent for “new” exports Baldwin (1975). However, new
import controls were imposed and most of the old import-protection
biases remained. This was a case, therefore, of increased import
restriction—which reduces the effective protection to export
producers—and real exchange rate depreciation. Notably, the minor
export boom that occurred during 1970-71 was not sustained. It
illustrates the need to coordinate the implementation of trade policy
reform with exchange rate adjustments, which are best regarded
as representing a policy package.
Exchange Rate Policy in Philippine Development
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Policy Developments in the 1980s
and Their Incentive Effects
The 1980s was a decade of marked turbulence in the Philippine
economy, reflected in the considerable instability in annual output
growth and inflation rates. Moreover, Philippine gross domestic
product (GDP) growth was drastically slower not only relative to
the preceding decade but also in comparison with the
contemporaneous performance of other developing countries in East
and South Asia (Bautista 1993). A major factor in the country’s dismal
economic record in the 1980s was the foreign-exchange crisis of
1983-85, during which real GDP declined (in absolute terms) by
more than 15 percent. The rapid expansion of external debt that
led to the exchange crisis was a consequence of the government
response to the external shocks that buffeted the economy
beginning with the oil crisis of 1973-74. Foreign borrowing was
increased sharply to accommodate the mounting current-account
deficits and a highly expansionary macroeconomic policy. In
hindsight at least, there was little regard to the productivity in
which the borrowed funds were spent (Bautista 1988).
A notable casualty of the debt-service crisis was the program
of industrial structural adjustment initiated in 1981 by the Philippine
government with World Bank technical and financial support. It
aimed at improving the international competitiveness of domestic
industry, which was found in a Tariff Commission (1979) study to
be more heavily protected than in other Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies. Trade liberalization measures
were a major component, including tariff reduction and relaxation
of import controls. Unfortunately, the foreign exchange crisis that
began in August 1983 overtook the program, and some of the
13Exchange Rate Policy in Philippine Development
intended measures, particularly the phasing out of import
restrictions, were superseded by policy actions introduced to deal
with short-term contingencies.
Beginning in October 1983, comprehensive controls on foreign
exchange and imports were put in place,3 supplanting the scheduled
lifting of import restrictions. The tariff revisions were implemented
through 1985, but made redundant by the exchange and import
controls. As a revenue measure and also to curtail imports, the
government imposed a general import tax of five percent in
November 1983, which was increased to eight percent in April 1984,
and then to 10 percent two months later. Additional export duties
ranging from two to five percent were levied on traditional export
products from November 1983 to December 1984 and an “economic
stabilization tax” of 30 percent was collected in June-September 1984.
Exchange rate policy also turned proactive. The peso was
devalued three times—in June 1983 by 7.8 percent to P11.00 per
dollar, then in October to P14.00 per dollar, and in June 1984 to P18.00
per dollar. In October 1984 the exchange rate regime reverted to
“managed floating.”
One favorable development during 1983-85 was the gradual
unification of the sales taxes on imports and import-competing
domestic products, which removed a long-standing source of
effective protection. Also, the mark-up rate on essential and semi-
essential goods was reduced to a uniform 25 percent in 1985. The
latter was phased out in 1996 by the Aquino government, which
also abolished export taxes (except on logs) and resumed import
liberalization. There were 951 import items liberalized in 1986,
roughly one-half consisting of highly protected manufactured
products (textile, leather, rubber and paper products). This was
followed by the liberalization of 170 additional import items in 1987,
209 in 1988, and 94 in 1999. What remained restricted at the end of
the decade were to be further reviewed (465 items) or would continue
to be restricted for national security and health reasons (114 items).
_______________
3It has been noted that the Central Bank priority listing tended “to give more protection to
heavily protected import substitutes while penalizing less protected sectors (e.g., exports)”
(Lamberte et al. 1985).
14These trade liberalization efforts were made under improving
macroeconomic conditions after the 1983-85 crisis, reflected in the
dramatic reduction in annual inflation rate from 34.5 percent
(average) in 1984-85 to 1.3 percent in 1986-87 and improvement in
current account balance from –4.1 percent of the gross national
product (GNP) in 1983-85 to 0.3 percent in 1986-88.
The evolution of Philippine trade and exchange rate policies
in the 1980s as described above demonstrates the significant
interrelations among macroeconomic, trade and exchange rate
policies. Unstable macroeconomic conditions caused by profligate
demand management prevented the implementation of a
substantive trade liberalization program in the first half of the
decade. It also forced the government to impose trade controls and
undertake large changes in the peso exchange rate to help stabilize
the economy. With the subsequent improvement in macroeconomic
stability, trade policy reform was implemented to a significant extent
and the foreign exchange market allowed to determine more freely
the exchange rate of the Philippine peso.
Table 1 contains annual values of three exchange rate indices
from 1980 to 1990, relating to: (a) the bilateral exchange rate of the
peso with the US dollar; (b) the nominal effective exchange rate,
represented in equation (1) above; and (c) the real effective exchange
rate represented in equation (2). It is seen that the peso-dollar and
nominal effective exchange rates increased continuously during the
decade, indicating a sustained nominal depreciation of the peso
relative to the US dollar and other trade-partner currencies (on
average). The time profile of the ratio index of NEER to the peso-
dollar exchange rate (Figure 1) shows lower values in the first half
of the decade (averaging 94) relative to the second half (averaging
112), implying a depreciated US dollar relative to the other partner
currencies—largely, the Japanese yen—in the latter period.
It is evident from Table 1 that the large NEER increases during
the crisis years from 1983 to 1985 did not translate into large REER
increases, having been severely eroded by rapid domestic inflation
(as noted above). Subsequently, the markedly lower inflation rates
made possible higher REER values. That the average value of the
REER index during 1986-90 was 36 percent higher than during 1980-
Policy Developments in the 1980s
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Table 1. Annual values of exchange rate indices,
1980-1990
Peso-US dollar Nominal effective Real effective
exchange rate exchange rate exchange rate
1980 100 100 100
1981 105 104 100
1982 113 105 96
1983 148 135 116
1984 223 202 122
1985 248 227 113
1986 272 283 141
1987 275 306 150
1988 281 329 153
1989 289 333 143
1990 324 369 146
Source:Author’s calculations based on data from PIDS Economic
and Social Database.
Figure 1. Ratio of NEER to peso-dollar exchange rate, 1980-1990
85 indicates a much improved price competitiveness of tradable
goods relative to nontradables in the second half of the decade. This
was despite the relatively larger nominal exchange rate depreciation
in the earlier period, which must have been swamped by the large
differential between domestic and foreign inflation rates at the time.
Thus, the highly expansionary macroeconomic policies that resulted
in rapid domestic inflation and macroeconomic instability during
16the first half of the 1980s not only derailed the trade liberalization
program but also impeded development of the tradable goods sector.
Conversely, macroeconomic stabilization in the second half of the
decade enabled the government to resume lowering trade barriers
and to promote growth of tradable goods production through the
REER-related improvement in price incentives.
The changes in REER during the two halves of the 1980s are
decomposed into their accounting components in Table 2. It shows
the dramatic reductions in NEER depreciation and domestic inflation
along with the larger REER depreciation during 1985-90 relative to
the earlier subperiod. The comparatively minor role of foreign
inflation in shaping the incentive structure between tradable and
nontradable goods in the 1980s is also evident from the table.
The behavioral determinants of the REER are investigated
quantitatively in Medalla et al. (1995). Based on regression analysis
using annual data for 1950-1980, the results show statistically
significant effects of trade policy (represented by the average implicit
tariff rate), current account balance (as a ratio to GDP), external terms
of trade, and as a short-run influence, the NEER. Thus, a 10 percent
reduction in the implicit tariff rate will depreciate the REER by 6.2
percent; a one percentage point increase in the ratio of the current
account balance to GDP will lead to a 3.8 percent REER rise; and a
Policy Developments in the 1980s
Table 2. Decomposition of REER changes in 1980-85
and 1985-90
1980-85 1985-90
Change in REER 12.1  25.6
Change in NEER 82.2 48.4
Change in P 88.9 37.4
Change in weighted Pi‘s 18.8 14.6
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes:  REER = real effective exchange rate; NEER = nominal effective
exchange rate; P = consumer price index; Pi = wholesale price index in
trade partner i. (Refer to equation (3) in text.) The entries are 100 times
the calculated changes in natural logarithms of the variables, which
therefore approximate the percentage changes over the indicated
subperiods.
17Exchange Rate Policy in Philippine Development
10 percent deterioration of the foreign terms of trade will increase
the REER by 6.4 percent. Also, other things remaining the same, 69
percent of a nominal exchange rate change will translate into an
REER adjustment within a year.
Analysis of the contributions of domestic policies and the
external terms of trade to the observed annual changes in the real
exchange rate in the 1980s indicates that exogenous terms-of-trade
movements were only a minor influence. Among the policy
variables, trade and nominal exchange rate policies contributed most
significantly to the REER changes for the four years in which there
were unusually large changes in the real exchange rate. In some
years the REER effects due to the policy variables are found to be
negative, reflecting a “lack of consistency with which the
improvement of the incentive structure for tradable goods
production was promoted during the period” (Medalla et al. 1985).
Within the tradable goods sector, estimates of effective
protection rates for the 1980s presented in Tan (1995) and Medalla
(1998) show only slight changes from 1983 to 1985 for importables
but a significant downward trend subsequently. This reflected the
negative effect of the foreign exchange crisis of 1983-85 on the trade
liberalization effort and the resumption of tariff reduction and easing
of import restrictions in 1986. While the EPR disparity between
import-competing and export-oriented sectors was significantly
reduced, the incentive bias against the latter persisted (Table 3).
There was also a substantial decline in EPR for manufacturing—
from 65 percent in 1983 to 24 percent in 1988, the latter only slightly
higher (by two percentage points) than the agricultural EPR in 1988.
Bringing down the effective protection for the manufacturing sector
as a whole would appear to be a major achievement of trade policy
reform in the 1980s; however, import-competing industries
continued to be highly favored relative to export-oriented sectors.
As pointed out earlier, the EPR can be adjusted for exchange
rate overvaluation—using equation (4) above to calculate the sectoral
NEPRs evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate. We make use
of the estimated elasticities of REER with respect to the trade policy
and current account variables from the Medalla et al. (1995) study,
as well as these variables’ actual values in 1983 and 1988, to obtain
18estimates of the degree of real exchange rate overvaluation for those
two years—which are 68.7 and 23.8 percent, respectively. The
markedly large overvaluation in 1983 can be attributed to the highly
restrictive trade regime (with an implicit tariff rate of 78 percent)
and drastically increased current account deficit (8.3 percent of
GDP) in the first year of the external debt crisis. The dramatic
decline in exchange rate overvaluation was due to the trade
liberalization measures implemented during 1983-88 (largely from
1986 to 1988, as described above) that reduced the implicit tariff
rate significantly to 38 percent, and the large reduction in current-
account deficit to 1.0 percent of GDP in 1988.
The calculated NEPR values are shown in Table 3. The effective
“disprotection” (negative protection) for agriculture is seen to have
dropped sharply (by 25 percentage points) from 1983 to 1988, almost
closing the gap between the agricultural and manufacturing NEPRs.
Relatedly, there was not much change in effective protection for
manufacturing. Even after removing the disincentive effect of
exchange rate overvaluation, the protection to import-competing
sectors afforded by trade and other policies in 1988 was still
significant (10 percent). At the same time, export-oriented sectors
19
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Table 3. EPR, NEPR, and NEPRT estimates for 1983 and 1988
(in percent)
1983 1988
EPR NEPR NEPRT EPR NEPR NEPRT
All importables 87.4  11.1  41.5 36.2  9.9 31.0
All exportables  -4.0 -43.4 -27.5  -4.7 -23.1  -8.4
Agriculture 24.2 -26.4 -6.2 22.3 -1.3 17.6
      Importables 88.4  11.7  42.3 35.9  9.7 30.7
      Exportables  -4.4 -43.3 -27.8  -0.9 -20.0  -4.7
Manufacturing 64.7 -2.4  24.4 24.3  0.3 19.5
      Importables 88.1  11.5  42.1 38.4  11.7 33.1
      Exportables   3.1 -38.9 -22.1  -6.3 -24.4  -9.9
Source: Medalla (1998) for EPRs; author’s calculations for NEPRs and NEPRT.
Note:  EPR = effective protection rate; NEPR = net effective protection rate (adjusted for
exchange rate overvaluation); NEPRT = net effective protection rate due to trade policy.in agriculture and manufacturing were subject to an effective
penalty of 20 and 24 percent of their value added, respectively.
In fact, trade restrictions are partly responsible for the exchange
rate overvaluation, as discussed above. The NEPR values understate
therefore the total effect of trade policy. Taking out the contribution
of import restrictions to the exchange rate overvaluation—effectively
correcting the EPR only for the overvaluation due to the current
account deficit—results in higher levels of net effective protection,
labeled NEPRT in Table 3. Import-competing sectors had NEPRT
values exceeding 40 percent in 1983, while export industries were
being penalized by trade policy by at least 20 percent of their value
added. In 1988, when the current account deficit was quite low,
import restrictions were the dominant contributor to the real
exchange rate overvaluation and accounted for a very large share
of effective protection across the board. Importables still benefited
from a high average NEPRT of 31 percent, which already reflected
the 10-percentage point decline from 1983. The final point to note
is that, even after adjusting for the overvalued exchange rate and
isolating the effect of trade policy, the above finding from EPR
comparison about the near closing of the protection gap between
manufacturing and agriculture in the second half of the 1980s still
holds.
Exchange Rate Policy in Philippine Development
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Developments Since the Early 1990s
Losing steam in 1989 and 1990 when threats to political stability
and a series of natural disasters plagued the Philippine economy,
trade liberalization efforts substantially picked up in 1991 with the
issuance of Executive Order (EO) 470. It represented the second
phase of the country’s tariff reform program, and continued the
movement toward tariff uniformity by reducing the number of
import items with high tariff rates and increasing the number with
low tariff rates over a period of five years. By 1995, as a result of EO
470, about 95 percent of the 5,561 tariff lines would be in the three
and 30 percent range.
Import liberalization also continued in the early 1990s,
accelerated in 1992 as QRs on 173 commodities were lifted (compared
to 17 in 1990-91). Under EO 8, issued in July 1992 by the Ramos
administration, 113 previously restricted import items were
“tariffied.” The adjusted tariff rates were generally higher than those
under EO 470 but the scheduled reductions would lead to roughly
the same rates in 1995.
In the second half of the decade, particularly in 1997 and 1998,
a series of EOs further lowered tariffs on capital equipment, spare
parts for machinery, other producer goods, and selected agricultural
and industrial products. By yearend 2000 more than 80 percent of
the total commodity lines were in the three to 10 percent tariff range.
Most quantitative restrictions had also been lifted, with tarriffication
for some agricultural products under EO 313; imports of rice
(exempted from tarrification until 2004) and some motor vehicle
products are the important exceptions. A declared objective of the
trade liberalization program is to adopt a uniform tariff rate of five
percent (except for “sensitive” farm products) by 2004.
21Exchange Rate Policy in Philippine Development
There have been some rough spots along the liberalization
route. Voices of dissent have been heard, clamoring for a slowdown
or even reversal of scheduled tariff changes and import liberalization.
In early 1999, EO 63 was issued that adjusted upward the scheduled
tariff changes for such products as textile and apparel, iron and steel,
pulp and paper, and petrochemicals. Other industries had proposed
various ways of increasing protection for their products. The well-
publicized demand of the petrochemical industry was for the
average tariff of 15 percent on competing imports in 2000 to remain
unchanged through 2010. Another example is the request for a
postponement of the deadline for removing the domestic content
requirement for automobiles.
The “backlash of protectionism” (Bautista and Tecson 2002)
and the earlier EO cuts in tariff rates on various producer goods
came at a time of financial difficulty for many firms and industries.
This difficulty was occasioned by the drastic increases in nominal
exchange rates of the Philippine peso in 1997 and 1998 as well as by
the rising interest rates and reduced access to bank credit—all related
to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. Precipitated by the massive
outflow of short-term capital, the turbulence in the external sector
of the crisis-afflicted countries had adversely affected overall
economic performance. In the Philippines, real GDP growth turned
negative (-0.6 percent) in 1998 and in the next three years averaged
only 3.5 percent annually (compared to 5.3 percent in the previous
three years).
As can be seen from Table 4, the Philippine peso depreciated
in nominal terms relative to the US dollar, and even more so—
especially in the first half of the decade—relative to the currencies
of other trade partners as a group. Although the exchange rate regime
was not quite an “implicit dollar standard” (Asian Development
Bank 2000),4 the peso-dollar exchange rate showed some inflexibility
at a time when the US dollar was weakening rapidly relative to other
22
_______________
4Unlike in Malaysia and Thailand, for example, where the domestic currencies’ exchange
rates with the US dollar even appreciated from 1990 to 1996. It is now widely believed that
the adoption of the implicit dollar standard in many Asian countries contributed to the Asian
financial crisis.major currencies, including the Japanese yen.5 The ratio of NEER
to the peso-dollar exchange rate increased continuously during
1990-95 (Figure 2), indicating a strengthening of trade-partner
currencies (as a group) relative to the US dollar.
Despite the NEER depreciation, there was a sustained decline
in the REER index until the onset of the Asian crisis. The real
23
_______________
5The Japanese yen appreciated relative to the US dollar by 43.2 percent from 1990 to 1995.
Table 4: Annual values of exchange rate indices, 1990-2001
Peso-US dollar Nominal effective Real effective
exchange rate exchange rate exchange rate
1990 100 100 100
1991 113 117 99
1992 105 110 91
1993 112 118 93
1994 109 120 87
1995 106 119 82
1996 108 117 75
1997 121 129 79
1998 168 169 99
1999 161 166 94
2000 182 190 103
2001 210 213  111
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from PIDS Economic
and Social Database.
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Figure 2. Ratio of NEER to peso-dollar exchange rate, 1990-2001Exchange Rate Policy in Philippine Development
exchange rate appreciated by 25 percent from 1990 to 1996,
significantly lowering the price incentive for producing tradable
goods. As discussed above, the government substantially reduced
tariffs and lifted import restrictions in the first half of the decade.
Thus, trade liberalization and real exchange rate appreciation took
place at the same time, inevitably operating at cross purposes. As
discussed earlier, the two do not constitute a desirable combination.
In the second half of the 1990s the most notable movement of
the exchange rate indices occurred during the Asian crisis when the
NEER and REER climbed up in 1998 by 31 and 25 percent,
respectively, the REER index almost reaching the 1990 level. A
comparatively modest decline in both indices took place in the next
year, followed by more significant increases in 2000 and 2001. It is
noteworthy that the REER finally exceeded the 1990 level in 2000,
and that its most recent evolution represents a major boost in price
competitiveness for the tradable goods sector, enhancing the capacity
of domestic producers to exploit their comparative advantage.
The contrasting REER changes and their accounting
components during the two subperiods until and after 1996 are
shown in Table 5. As in the preceding decade, foreign inflation was
not a major factor in the observed behavior of the real exchange
rate. In the pre-crisis period the REER appreciation—which as noted
above was inconsistent with the ongoing trade liberalization effort—
was associated with rapid domestic inflation and a somewhat
inflexible nominal exchange rate (reflecting an implicit
preoccupation of policymakers with the peso-dollar exchange rate).
What happened in the later period was a complete reversal: despite
the drastic increase in NEER (a forced response to regional
developments), domestic inflation was relatively mild and the REER
increased significantly, more than making up for the real
appreciation of the pre-crisis period. In the wake of the Asian
financial crisis, there was an apparent policy improvement towards
promoting the tradable goods sector.
Turning now to the behavioral determinants of the real
exchange rate in the 1990s, Table 6 contains the observed values in
1991, 1995 and 1999 of some policy and external factors that influence
the REER. As discussed above, trade liberalization continued in the
241990s, which is corroborated by the downward trend in the two
aggregate measures of import restrictions given by the sector-
weighted average implicit tariff and effective protection rates. The
larger rate cuts between 1991 and 1995 are consistent with the relative
effectiveness of EO 470. There was policy inconsistency, however,
in the simultaneous REER appreciation and trade liberalization in
the first half of the decade, as noted earlier. Indeed, the effect of the
latter would have been to depreciate the real exchange rate (see
above), which apparently was swamped by the countervailing
influence of the current account deficit that more than doubled (as a
Table 5. Decomposition of REER changes
in 1990-1996 and 1996-2001
1990-1996 1996-2001
Change in REER -27.9 38.3
Change in NEER  15.8 59.8
Change in P  56.4 31.7
Change in weighted Pi‘s  12.7 10.7
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: REER = real effective exchange rate; NEER = nominal
effective exchange rate; P = consumer price index; Pi = wholesale
price index in trade partner i. (Refer to equation (3) in text.) The
entries are 100 times the calculated changes in natural logarithms
of the variables, which therefore approximate the percentage
changes over the indicated subperiods.
Table 6: Policy and external influences on the real exchange rate,
1991, 1995 and 1999
1991 1995 1999
Trade policy
Average implicit tariff rate (percent)   25.7   20.9   17.3
Average effective protection rate (percent)   27.6   21.9   18.6
Nominal effective exchange rate (1990=100) 117.0 119.0 190.0
Current account balance (percent of GDP)   -1.91   -4.45     9.16
External terms of trade index (1995=100) 116.0 100.0 127.0
Source: PIDS Economic and Social Database; Asian Development Bank (2001).
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percentage of GDP) from 1991 to 1995. Note also that the external
terms of trade deteriorated, which likely would have had a
depreciating effect on the real exchange rate.
In the second half of the decade trade liberalization contributed
to the observed depreciation of the real exchange rate. Also, nominal
exchange rate policy was supportive of REER depreciation,
considering the drastic increase in the NEER from 1995 to 1999.
However, the most important depreciating effect on the real
exchange rate came from the marked improvement in the current
account balance (Table 6). It exceeded significantly the REER
appreciation induced by the 27 percent improvement in the external
terms of trade, going by the estimated elasticities from the Medalla
et al. (1995) study.6
Finally, let us consider the changes in relative production
incentives among tradable goods since the early 1990s. Continuing
the trend observed in the 1980s, the sectoral EPR estimates presented
in Table 7 show a significantly lower value for “all importables”
sector in 2000 than in 1992, and with only a slight change for “all
exportables,” the EPR gap between importables and exportables was
further reduced. The narrowing of this gap was more pronounced
in manufacturing than in agriculture. It is also notable that the
agricultural EPR declined only slightly from 1992 to 2000, but the
substantial reduction in manufacturing EPR led to a reversal of
the traditional EPR bias against agriculture. Thus, in 2000, effective
protection in agriculture was nearly five percentage points higher
than in manufacturing.
Adjusting the EPRs for exchange rate overvaluation, one
obtains the NEPRs. Using (again, with qualification) the elasticity
coefficients in the estimated REER equation in Medalla et al. (1995),
together with the 1992 and 2000 values of the trade policy and current
account variables, we calculate the exchange rate overvaluation at
23.2 percent in 1992 and 4.9 percent in 2000. The latter’s unusually
low value can be attributed to the current account surplus in 2000
that undervalued the real exchange rate, which, however, was more
_______________
6Because the estimated REER equation in the study is based on 1950-1980 data, it may not
be appropriate to use the elasticity coefficients for the 1990s.
26than offset by the overvaluation due to the remaining trade
restrictions.
A higher level of effective protection for agriculture relative to
manufacturing in 2000 is also shown by the comparative NEPR
estimates for the two sectors. Somewhat surprising is that the NEPRs
for manufacturing importables and all importables in 2000 were
higher than in 1992, considering the substantial import liberalization
that took place in the 1990s. However, in isolating the effect of trade
policy on effective protection at the equilibrium exchange rate, the
NEPRT estimates show lower values for the two sectors in 2000 than
in 1992 (Table 7). The comparative NEPRT values also indicate higher
effective protection due to trade policy for agriculture than for
manufacturing in 2000, especially between importables in the two
sectors. This is attributable to the tarrification of QRs in some major
farm products that exceeded the equivalent tariffs at the time or the
book tariff rates under EO 470 (David 1994). Notably, it is the
increasing protection in agriculture, not declining manufacturing
protection, that was behind the reversal of the protection gap
between the two sectors in the 1990s.
Table 7: EPR, NEPR and NEPRT estimates for 1992 and 2000
(in percent)
1992 2000
EPR NEPR NEPRT EPR NEPR NEPRT
All importables 41.0  14.4  32.6 23.4 17.6 29.8
All exportables  -4.5 -22.5 -10.2  -1.6  -6.2   3.5
Agriculture 22.4   -0.6  15.1 20.4 14.8 26.6
Importables 36.1  10.5  28.0 32.7 26.5 39.5
Exportables  -0.7 -19.4   -6.6  -0.4  -5.1   4.7
Manufacturing 28.9    4.6  21.3 15.7   9.7 21.7
Importables 44.9  17.6  36.3 23.9 18.1 30.3
Exportables  -5.7 -23.5 -11.3  -2.1  -6.7   2.9
Source: Medalla (1998) for EPRs; author’s calculations for NEPRs and NEPRTs.
Note:  EPR = effective protection rate; NEPR = net effective protection rate (adjusted for
exchange rate overvaluation); NEPRT = net effective protection rate due to trade policy.
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Conclusion
The real exchange rate is arguably the most important relative
price variable in an open economic system. Many developing
economies, including the Philippines, have floundered as a
consequence of the real exchange rate being heavily overvalued.
On the other hand, the economic performance of countries like
Singapore and Malaysia have benefited from maintaining “realistic
and competitive” real exchange rates.
The real exchange rate links the nominal exchange rate (which
the government can control) to the real sphere of the national
economy—most directly, to relative incentives among production
sectors—through which the further effects of exchange rate policy
on resource allocation, output growth, income distribution, and other
development concerns can be analyzed. An appreciation of the real
exchange rate, from whatever source, reduces the price
competitiveness of tradable goods and makes it more difficult for
domestic producers to exploit their comparative advantage. If the
real exchange rate is already overvalued to begin with, a sustained
appreciation can only lead to increased inefficiency in resource
allocation and investment, reduced growth of domestic output and
labor employment, and because the unemployed and under-
employed are mostly from the low-income population, a worsening
of income inequality and poverty.
The role of exchange rate policy in Philippine economic
development cannot be properly examined without consideration
of its interactions with trade and macroeconomic policies, in view
of the latter policies’ analytical and empirical linkages to the real
exchange rate. As discussed above, the Philippine experience in the
1980s and 1990s amply demonstrates the significant influences of
28trade and macroeconomic policies not only on the conduct of
exchange rate policy but also on the evolution of the real exchange
rate and extent of its overvaluation.
An important distinction is made between real exchange rate
appreciation or depreciation that represents a movement over time,
and its overvaluation or undervaluation which is in reference to an
equilibrium value of the real exchange rate at a given time. The latter
is defined by an unrestricted trade regime and current account
balance. Real exchange rate overvaluation results from a restrictive
trade policy and macroeconomic policies that lead to a deficit in the
current account. It is a policy-induced incentive bias against tradable
goods production, and can be redressed only by removing the trade
restrictions and the current account deficit. Adjusting the nominal
exchange rate can bring about real exchange rate depreciation that
may reduce a high degree of real exchange rate overvaluation.
However, without accompanying trade liberalization and
macroeconomic policies that reduce the current account deficit,
depreciating the nominal exchange rate will not lead in the long
run to a less overvalued real exchange rate.
In the 1980s the large nominal (effective) exchange rate
depreciation during the 1983-85 crisis did not translate into a
significant depreciation of the real (effective) exchange rate, owing
in part to the suspension of import liberalization measures at a time
of macroeconomic instability. Subsequently, despite the relatively
smaller NEER increases in the second half of the decade, a larger
REER depreciation was achieved with the resumption of trade
liberalization and reduction of the current account deficit. This was
accompanied by a substantial decline in real exchange rate
overvaluation.
Considering that there are other influences on the real exchange
rate, trade liberalization can take place simultaneously with a real
exchange rate appreciation. In the 1990s, despite the NEER
depreciation and significant trade liberalization, the REER
depreciated almost continuously until the onset of the Asian financial
crisis. As discussed above, the effects on the trade balance, domestic
output, and employment arising from trade liberalization combined
with real exchange rate appreciation are negative. This pre-Asian
29
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crisis experience of policy inconsistency points to the need for proper
coordination among exchange rate, trade, and macroeconomic
policies in order to achieve desired objectives.
From 1996 to 2001 the REER index increased, more than
compensating for the real appreciation in the earlier period. It was
facilitated by a drastic NEER rise (responding to regional
developments) and a relatively mild domestic inflation.
Concurrently, the current account balance improved and trade
liberalization continued, reducing dramatically the overvaluation
of the real exchange rate. Thus, in the wake of the Asian financial
crisis, it would seem that there was an overall policy improvement
towards the encouragement of tradable goods production.
Within the tradable goods sector, the vigorous efforts in tariff
reduction and import liberalization in the second half of the 1980s
are reflected in the substantial decline in effective protection rates
for importables and narrowing of the EPR gap between importables
and exportables. Even more dramatic is the observed reduction in
the disparity between manufacturing and agricultural EPRs, which
was cut down to two percentage points by 1988. Adjusting for
exchange rate overvaluation and isolating the effect of trade policy
lead to the same finding about the near closing of the historically
wide protection gap between manufacturing and agriculture.
In the more recent period since the early 1990s, a further
reduction of EPR for importables, especially manufacturing
importables, took place. This reflected the continuing import
liberalization, particularly during 1991-1995. The EPR gap between
importables and exportables was also reduced significantly, despite
which importables still benefited from an EPR of more than 20
percent in 2000. On the other hand, the traditional EPR disparity
between manufacturing and agriculture was reversed in the 1990s,
the agricultural EPR being higher by five percentage points by 2000.
Isolating the effect of trade policy on effective protection at the
equilibrium exchange rate, our estimates show that rising
agricultural protection, more than declining manufacturing
protection, was the chief reason for the reversal of the protection
gap between the two sectors. Indeed, there has been increasing
protection for major import-competing agricultural products in
30recent years. Since agricultural exportables are still subject to low or
negative effective protection, increasing incentives for exportable
commodities would seem to provide some scope for policy
improvement towards promoting uniformity in the protection
system.
The good news about the real exchange rate is that in its most
recent evolution (since 1997), the REER index has been increasing
and that real exchange rate overvaluation has been reduced to a
reasonable degree. The bad news is that the REER index in 2001
was only 11 percent higher than its 1990 value. A lot of ground was
lost in the 1990-96 period of falling REER. It is ironic that the forced
response to the Asian financial crisis served to reverse the tide and
began to improve the price competitiveness of tradable goods
production in the Philippines. This recent boost to the tradable goods
sector needs to be sustained if the Philippines is to continue to pursue
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